Validity, Inter-rater Reliability, and Measures of Adaptive Behavior: Concerns Regarding the Probative versus Prejudicial Value by Salekin, Karen L. et al.
Running Head: ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR MEASURE LIMITATIONS   1 
 
Salekin, K.L., Neal, T.M.S., & Hedge, K.A. (2018). Validity, inter-rater reliability, and measures of 
adaptive behavior: Concerns regarding the probative versus prejudicial value.  Psychology, Public 
Policy, and Law, 24, 24-35. doi: 10.1037/law0000150  
 
© American Psychological Association, 2018. This paper is not the copy of record and may not 
exactly replicate the authoritative document published in the APA journal. The final article is 
available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/law0000150  
ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR MEASURE LIMITATIONS     2  
 
 
 
 
Validity, Inter-rater Reliability, and Measures of Adaptive Behavior: Concerns Regarding the 
Probative versus Prejudicial Value 
 
Karen L. Salekin, The University of Alabama  
Tess M.S. Neal, Arizona State University 
Krystal A. Hedge, Federal Medical Center Devens 
 
 
 
Author Note 
Portions of this paper were presented at the 2010 annual conference of the American 
Psychology-Law Society in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.  
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Karen L. Salekin, The 
Department of Psychology, 348 Gordon Palmer Hall, The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, 
AL 35487-0348, USA.  E-mail: ksalekin@ua.edu 
ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR MEASURE LIMITATIONS     3  
Abstract 
The question as to whether the assessment of adaptive behavior (AB) for evaluations of 
intellectual disability (ID) in the community meet the level of rigor necessary for admissibility in 
legal cases is addressed. Adaptive behavior measures have made their way into the forensic 
domain where scientific evidence is put under great scrutiny. Assessment of ID in capital murder 
proceedings has garnished a lot of attention, but assessments of ID in adult populations also 
occur with some frequency in the context of other criminal proceedings (e.g., competence to 
stand trial; competence to waive Miranda rights), as well as eligibility for social security 
disability, social security insurance, Medicaid/Medicare, government housing, and post-
secondary transition services. As will be demonstrated, markedly disparate findings between 
raters can occur on measures of AB even when the assessment is conducted in accordance with 
standard procedures (i.e., the person was assessed in a community setting, in real time, with 
multiple appropriate raters, when the person was younger than 18 years of age) and similar 
disparities can be found in the context of the unorthodox and untested retrospective assessment 
used in capital proceedings. With full recognition that some level of disparity is to be expected, 
the level of disparity that can arise when these measures are administered retrospectively calls 
into question the validity of the results and consequently, their probative value.  
Keywords: adaptive behavior measures; Atkins; forensic evaluations; 
admissibility; validity; inter-rater reliability 
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Validity, Inter-rater Reliability, and Measures of Adaptive Behavior: Concerns Regarding the 
Probative versus Prejudicial Value 
In Atkins v. Virginia (2002), the U.S. Supreme banned the execution of individuals with 
intellectual disability on the basis that doing so would violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. In the 15 years that have passed since the 
ruling, the assessment of ID has become a central issue in over 436 capital cases, from which 
only 60 claimants  have been found to have ID.1 (L. Vann, Fellowship Attorney, Death Penalty 
Resource & Defense Center, personal communication, January 30, 2017). The legal issue in what 
are now termed “Atkins cases,” is unlike any other in forensic psychology. In this domain the 
trier-of-fact is not interested in how symptoms of the condition impact a defendant’s ability to 
participate in judicial proceedings, or if the symptoms present at the time of the crime were 
sufficient to reduce culpability, the question to be answered is simply whether the condition 
exists at all.   
Intellectual Disability and Adaptive Behavior 
There exist two primary definitions of intellectual disability (ID) that, though slightly 
different, are fundamentally the same. The diagnosis of intellectual disability is made when a 
person has significant limitations in both intellectual ability and adaptive functioning, with onset 
occurring during the developmental period (American Association on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), 2010; American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2013). 
According to the AAIDD, adaptive behavior is defined as “the collection of conceptual, social, 
and practical skills that have been learned and are performed by people in their everyday lives” 
                                                          
1 This value is derived from a review of decisions reported in the Westlaw electronic legal database and as such, 
does not include cases that settled at the trial level or that have not been appealed.  
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(AAIDD, 2010, p. 43)2 and an almost identical definition is in place for the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA, 2013). Using the language put forth by the AAIDD, “significant limitations in 
adaptive behavior should (emphasis added) be established through the use of standardized 
measures, normed on the general population, including people with disabilities and people 
without disabilities” (AAIDD, 2010, p. 43). Significant deficits equate to scores that are 
“approximately two standard deviations below the mean of either (a) one of the following three 
types of adaptive behavior: conceptual, social, or practical, or (b) an overall score on a measure 
of conceptual, social, and practical skills” (AAIDD, 2010, p. 43). Though the AAIDD does not 
mandate the use of adaptive behavior measures, the use of the word “should” is sufficient to 
persuade many clinicians and legal professionals that a standardized measure is necessary under 
most circumstances.  
The assessment of intellectual disability dates back to the 1920's, and in search of 
precision, organizations such as the AAIDD, the APA, the World Health Organization, among 
others, established ever-changing rules for the assessment of the condition. For more than 30 
years, the diagnosis of ID rested solely on measured intelligence, but as of 1961 adaptive 
behavior was added to the official definition of the American Association on Mental Deficiency 
(now the American Association on Developmental Disabilities; AAIDD).The first widely-used 
measure of adaptive behavior was the Vineland Social Maturity Scale (VMS; Doll, 1953), 
published by the AAMD in 1953. At present, some of the most commonly used measures of 
adaptive behavior are the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System (currently in its third version; 
ABAS-III; Harrison & Oakland, 2015), the Scales of Independent Behavior-Revised (SIB-R; 
Bruininks, Woodcock, Weatherman, & Hill, 1996), and the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales 
                                                          
2 This tri-partite definition of adaptive behavior was adopted by the American Psychiatric Association in the most 
recent iteration of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5; APA, 2013). 
ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR MEASURE LIMITATIONS     6  
(currently in its third version; VABS-3; Sparrow, Cicchetti, & Saulnier, 2016). The ratings on 
these measures are of abilities, and the frequency and level of independence with which they are 
carried out. All three are used for diagnostic purposes and compare an individual’s scores with 
population norms. 
Since Atkins, it has become clear that the assessment of ID is anything but 
straightforward. Though the Justices alluded to the value of the diagnostic criteria set forth by the 
APA and the AAIDD, the Supreme Court (i.e., the Supreme Court of the United States) left it to 
the states to develop appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction. However, in a 
recent decision, the Court curtailed the power afforded to the states and mandated adherence to 
the well-established medical practice of the applying the standard error of measurement to the 
interpretation of an intelligence quotient (Hall v. Florida, 2014). In Moore v. Texas, 2016, the 
Court further delineated the boundaries of discretion and mandated that adjudications of 
intellectual disability should be “informed by the views of medical experts.” Writing for the 
majority, Justice Ginsberg reaffirmed that the states do not have unfettered discretion and cannot 
use non-clinical, judicially-developed criteria for diagnosing intellectual disability. The criteria at 
issue were the seven factors outlined in Ex Parte Briseno (2004), but Moore forces all states to 
determine adaptive functioning consistent with the extant standards of the medical community – 
not standards promulgated by judges. The reasoning of Moore helps to delineate the basis by 
which the triers-of-fact are to make their determinations regarding adaptive behavior, and may 
impact the process by which it is assessed.  
Unlike the assessment of intellectual functioning, the assessment of adaptive behavior is 
somewhat unstandardized and subjective, a fact often noted by the judiciary (see for example 
Doss v. State, 2009; U.S. v. Hardy, 2010; Wiley v. Epps, 2010). Though guidelines for 
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assessment exist, clinicians have much flexibility in choosing the techniques they employ and the 
weight they place on the information gathered. The type of information gathered, and the 
weighting thereof, is then used to support their position regarding a claimant’s status in relation 
to ID. Although attempts to standardize the assessment of ID have been made (see AAIDD, 
2010; APA, 2013; Schalock et. al., 2010), that which is standard of practice in the community 
setting (i.e., an assessment conducted in real-time) typically cannot be adhered to when 
conducting an Atkins evaluation. In an Atkins hearing, as well as all evaluations conducted in the 
adult legal system, the assessment is retrospective (Young, Boccaccini, Conroy, & Lawson, 
2007).   
Case law provides one avenue for review of the methods that forensic clinicians have 
used to assess intellectual disability and in some cases the triers-of-fact have provided detailed 
accounts of their formulations of the case and the how they viewed the information provided by 
the expert(s) (see for example U.S. v. Smith, 2011; Thomas v. Allen, 2009). In U.S. v. Smith, 
Judge Berrigan noted the following:  
Unlike in a medical, educational, or social services context, the law is concerned with 
what was rather than what is. The point of an Atkins hearing is to determine whether a 
person was mentally retarded at the time of the crime and therefore ineligible for the 
death penalty, not whether a person is currently mentally retarded and therefore in need 
of special services. Because of this, the diagnosis of mental retardation in the Atkins 
context will always be complicated by the problems associated with retrospective 
diagnosis.   
These problems are only compounded by the fact that both the APA and AAMR 
define mental retardation as a developmental disability and limit the diagnosis to those 
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persons who exhibited the required characteristics prior to age 18. As those under the age 
of 18 are already constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty, Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005), no clinician evaluating a person for purposes of an Atkins hearing will 
ever be evaluating the person prior to age 18. Mental retardation in the Atkins context, if 
it is to be diagnosed at all, must therefore be diagnosed retrospectively.  (p. 43) 
Due to the lack of research in the retrospective application of these measures, judges are 
free to interpret the data how they choose; they may view the standard scores to be valid or they 
may look at the data in other ways. For example, in U.S. v. Smith (2011), Judge Berrigan went to 
great lengths to evaluate the consistency of ratings and, due to vastly different opinions of 
opposing experts, she chose to go beyond review of standard scores and conducted an evaluation 
of differences at the item level. Specifically, she compared individual scores, for each question, 
for three raters on the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale – Second Edition (VASB-II; Sparrow, 
Cichetti, & Bella; 2005; 429 items) and two raters on the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System 
(ABAS-II; Harrison and Oakland, 2003; 239 items). In Smith, the expert for the State was of the 
opinion that the raters deliberately lowered their ratings to ensure that the deficits in adaptive 
behavior would meet threshold; the expert for the claimant was not. 
The results of Judge Berrigan’s investigation of the VABS-II resulted in perfect 
consistency for 88% of the items, and 77% and 88% when two of the three raters (i.e., mother, an 
older sister, and a younger sister) produced identical scores. She noted that when discrepancies 
were found, the majority of scores were within one point of each other; she further noted that two 
point discrepancies occurred only 8% of the time. As noted by Judge Berrigan, “This consistency 
strongly supports the reliability of the tests and the conclusion that the three respondents were 
not deliberately exaggerating his deficits” (p. 55). Of interest, consistency on the ABAS-II was 
ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR MEASURE LIMITATIONS     9  
substantially lower with approximately 54% of the answers between Smith’s sisters having been 
identical, 43% with one level of disparity, and 3% with more than a one level difference. Judge 
Berrigan made no comment on her views of these findings. 
As evident by the above example, the use of adaptive behavior measures in Atkins 
hearings is less than perfect and conclusions arise on the basis of a combination of clinical 
judgment, common sense, and strategies not yet examined. The question for the Court is whether 
adaptive behavior measures are sufficiently reliable to be admitted into legal proceedings when 
used in an unorthodox, untested manner, with no known rate of error, and in a manner that is not 
generally accepted by the scientific community. Another way to conceptualize the retrospective 
evaluation is to ask whether a person’s current memory, of their past perceptions, of another 
person’s behavior, at a specific point in the distant past, in any way comports with reality.  
The Daubert Trilogy 
Problems associated with the assessment of vaguely defined constructs, as is the 
construct of adaptive behavior, are not new and neither are the associated issues of admissibility. 
One need only look to the history of admissibility of expert testimony to know that the judiciary 
has been struggling to find a balance between acceptance of new (and at times old) science and 
permitting only that which meets the indiscernible line of acceptability. An in-depth discussion 
of the rules of admissibly is outside of the scope of this paper, but understanding the trajectory 
from early decisions, such as Frye v. United States (1923) to present, is important.  
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997), 
and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) together constitute what is oft referred to as “The 
Daubert Trilogy.” Arising from this trilogy are guidelines and procedures for determining the 
evidentiary reliability of expert testimony and subsequent admissibility (Merlino et. al, 2007). 
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The trilogy extended the analysis from legal merits and general acceptance (Frye v. United 
States, 1923) to include judicial scrutiny regarding qualifications of the experts, their methods of 
investigation, and the conclusions drawn from those procedures (Merlino et. al, 2007). As per 
Daubert, expert testimony is evaluated on the following five factors: 
(1) whether the expert's technique or theory can be or has been tested—that is, whether 
the expert's theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is instead 
simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for 
reliability;  
(2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication;  
(3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied;  
(4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and  
(5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific 
community. 
With regard to the analysis, the Daubert Court stated that the inquiry is flexible and the focus 
must be on the relevance and reliability of the expert’s methodology, rather than the conclusions 
generated by those methods. Hence, these factors are neither exhaustive nor dispositive.  
In General Electric v. Joiner (1997), the Supreme Court noted that the essence of 
Daubert is to ensure that the evidence admitted is not only relevant but also reliable, and the 
Justices stressed that the link between the scientific testimony and facts must be directly 
applicable to the case at hand. Echoing the decision in Daubert, the Joiner court noted that trier-
of-fact must be able to evaluate the relevance and reliability of the experts’ methodology – not 
just their conclusions.   
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Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) dealt with the type of evidence that fell under the 
gatekeeping role of the Court. The Court ruled that the gatekeeping obligation applies not only to 
scientific testimony, but to all expert testimony including that which is technical or otherwise 
specialized. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the flexibility of the gatekeeping criteria, holding 
that judges may consider one or more of the factors articulated in Daubert when determining 
reliability, but that those factors need not necessarily nor exclusively be applied to all experts, or 
in every case. The Court concluded that,  
the trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert’s 
reliability, and to decide whether or when a special briefing or other proceedings are 
needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether that expert’s 
relevant testimony is reliable. (p. 152, emphases in original)  
The Federal Rules of Evidence 702 (F.R.E. 702) clarifies when and how witnesses are 
qualified to testify as experts. This rule, first put forth in 1973 and modified in 2000 and 2011, 
was referenced numerous times in the Daubert trilogy. As per Rule 702, 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:  
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;  
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;  
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the 
case. 
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Upon review of the trilogy and the F.R.E., it is clear that findings based on the retrospective use 
of adaptive behavior measures3 may not meet the standards of admissibility. 
Measurement 
From 1932 to 1940, the British Association for the Advancement of Science debated the 
meaning of measurement, and after much discussion, the 19-member committee came to some 
agreement that the broadest and most useful definition of measurement is "the assignment of 
numerals to things so as to represent facts and conventions about them" (Stevens, 1946; p. 680). 
As noted by Stevens (1946), what is and is not measurement boils down to the answer to one 
question: “What are the rules, if any, under which numerals are assigned? If we can point to a 
consistent set of rules, we are obviously concerned with measurement ….”(p. 680). 
Measurement is the foundation of psychological testing. A psychological test provides a 
systematic method for obtaining one or more samples of behavior and for scoring and evaluating 
those samples according to empirically derived standards (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997; Urbina 
2004). Though psychological tests are only one component of an assessment, the results of 
testing are used to make important decisions. In her discussion of psychological tests as tools, 
Urbina (2004) discussed the value of tests, but added a cautionary note: “Like other tools, 
psychological tests can be exceedingly helpful – even irreplaceable – when used appropriately 
and skillfully. However, tests can also be misused in ways that may limit or thwart their 
usefulness and, at times, even result in harmful consequences” (p. 4). Part of ensuring that the 
results of testing are not misused is to ensure that the test are administered, scored, and 
interpreted in the manner with which they were developed. Once again, when used to 
                                                          
3 The points of analysis in this manuscript focus solely on adaptive behavior measures, not the assessment of 
adaptive behavior in an Atkins case. Adaptive behavior measures, when used in such cases, represent one method of 
assessing adaptive behavior among many that must be considered by the evaluating clinician and the presiding 
judge. 
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retrospectively evaluate adaptive behavior, measures of adaptive behavior fall short of the ideals 
of measurement as the retrospective administration, scoring, and interpretation of the data is not 
consistent with the manner in which the adaptive behavior measures were developed. 
Measures of Adaptive Behavior: Test Administration and Interpretation 
Respondents 
By design, measures of adaptive behavior are to be completed by knowledgeable 
respondents, based on their recent observations of an individual’s behavior; in other words, these 
measures are completed in real time, not at some time in the distant past. In the manual, the 
authors of the ABAS-3 stress the importance of the type of respondent, their knowledge of the 
person, and their current level of contact (Harrison & Oakland, 2015): 
All respondents should have had frequent, recent, prolonged contact with the individual 
(e.g., most days, over the last few months, for several hours each day). These contacts 
must have offered the respondent an opportunity to observe the various adaptive skill 
areas measured by the ABAS-3. (p. 9) 
In only the rarest of circumstances can these rules be adhered to, so from the outset the validity 
of the results are almost always called into question. 
Multiple Domains 
Assessing typical performance across multiple settings is necessary because reliance on 
an individual’s functioning in one setting may provide an inaccurate portrayal of an individual’s 
ability to function on a day-to-day basis (AAIDD, 2010; Greenspan & Switzky, 2006; Harrison 
& Oakland, 2015; Macvaugh & Cunningham, 2009; Sparrow et al., 2005; Widaman & 
Siperstein, 2009). For children and youth, information regarding functional ability within both 
the home environment and the community can almost always be obtained. For the most part, 
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assessments of children and youth will also include ratings from informants who are also 
knowledgeable about their behavior within academic settings and these recollections and 
observations can be supplemented by records that are available and being created in present time 
(e.g., special education; resource education; mainstream education; vocational training).  
The type of data available for children and youth is not always available for evaluations 
of adults. For many Atkins claimants, the evaluations are conducted many years after they exited 
the developmental period and the passage of time negatively impacts the collection of data. 
Many times collateral sources from the community (e.g., neighbors; friends; employers; store 
clerks) cannot be located and even if located, their memories are often poor and are always 
influenced by experiences that have occurred since the individual turned 18. Teachers from the 
past are often deceased or cannot be found, and those found have memories that have changed 
with the passage of time and experiences. In addition, academic records are often unavailable 
because they have been destroyed or the data is insufficient to support or refute deficits in this 
domain. 
Multiple Raters 
In addition to selecting appropriate raters across multiple domains, it is standard practice 
to obtain data from multiple raters (AAIDD, 2010). The underlying rationale is that the 
assessment will be more accurate when evaluating behavior across informants and across 
domains (see for example AAIDD, 2010; Harrison & Oakland, 2015; Macvaugh & Cunningham, 
2009; Widaman & Siperstein, 2009). As noted by Harrison and Oakland (2003), “the use of 
multiple respondents can provide information about the degree of consistency of an individual’s 
adaptive skills across settings, in response to different environmental demands, and from the 
unique perspectives of different respondents” (Harrison & Oakland, 2003, p. 19).  
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Inter-rater Reliability 
While it is true that consistency allows for a higher level of certainty that the information 
accurately reflects an individual’s abilities,  the opposite may not be true (see for example, 
Achenbach, McConaughy, & Howell, 1987; Szatmari, P., Archer, L., Fisman, S., & Streiner, D. 
L., 1994; De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2005; De Los Reyes, A., 2011). This sentiment was clearly 
articulated by Voelker, Shore, Hakim-Larson and Bruner (1997) two decades ago in the context 
of behavioral ratings of children:  
Obtaining reports from informants who know the child in different contexts, such as the 
child's parent and teacher, increases the behavioral repertoire sampled and provides a 
more complete description of the child's skills. However, this breadth of behavioral 
sampling can result in low rates of agreement between informants, raising questions 
about the source of the inconsistency. Discrepancies between reports of teachers and 
parents may reflect unreliability or lack of comparability of the measure(s), rater bias, or 
genuine differences in the child's behavior between the two environments. Evaluators are 
often encouraged to take advantage of multiple sources of information for making 
decisions regarding program planning for children (e.g., Sattler, 1988), but this advice 
presumes both good interrater reliability for the measure(s) used and a sufficient research 
base to permit evaluation of any systematic sources of disagreements that occur. (p. not 
provided) 
The research that has identified inconsistency as the norm is largely from child and adolescent 
studies of mental health rather than those of adaptive behavior. The lower level of consistency 
may be due to the fact that some of ratings on these scales require memories and speculation 
rather than observation. However, there exists research in the area of functional behavior 
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analysis (Newton & Sturmey, 1991; Paclawskyj et al., 2001; Sigafoos, Kerr, & Roberts, 1994; 
Thompson & Emerson, 1995; Shogren & Rojahn, 2003; Zarcone, Rodgers, Iwata, Rourke, & 
Dorsey, 1991) that supports the position that the findings of this research transfer to ratings of 
adaptive behavior.  
With the acknowledgment that perfect concordance is not expected, test developers 
provide inter-rater reliability statistics within and across domains. The fact that these studies are 
conducted implies that some level of concordance is expected and that there is a point where 
concordance is deemed unacceptable. Generally speaking, reliability coefficients reflect the 
proportion of “true” information about a construct in comparison to that random variability. For 
example, if inter-rater reliability was found to be .8, 80% of the variability in scores reflects a 
measure of the construct and 20% something else. The higher the reliability coefficient, the more 
certain one can be in that the measure is tapping a construct that can be measured.  
Test developers almost invariably offer inter-rater reliability coefficients for two raters 
from the same setting (e.g., family = two parents; academic = two teachers/teacher’s aides), 
which is necessary and appropriate. However, as is evident below, the number of studies 
conducted by the developers of the SIB-R, the ABAS (versions II and III), and the VABS 
(versions II and 3) are few and the samples less than optimal for evaluating consistency nearing 
the tails of the distribution. There are only three studies conducted with individuals with 
intellectual disability, all of which are problematic (Bruininks, Woodcock, Weatherman, & Hill, 
1984; Bruininks, Woodcock, Weatherman, & Hill, 1996). First, they were done many years ago, 
and second, the samples are not reflective of those who enter the legal system. One study utilized 
a sample of children diagnosed with moderate intellectual disability and the others utilized 
samples of children and/or youth diagnosed with either the moderate and/or severe intellectual 
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disability. The findings of these studies, while important, are of little value an assessment of 
adaptive behavior within the legal system because most individuals fall in the mild category of 
intellectual disability.  
Inter-rater Reliability: SIB-R, ABAS II and III, and VABS II and 3 
Scales of Independent Behavior-Revised (SIB-R; Bruininks, Woodcock, 
Weatherman, & Hill, 1996). As part of the norming process, the authors of the SIB-R 
conducted three very small-scale studies of inter-rater reliability with children and raters from 
two domains (home; school) who had opportunities to observe the child in the same setting. The 
sample size for study one was 26 and the raters were fathers and mothers. The sample size for 
study two was 30 and the raters were teachers and teacher’s aids. Correlations were high and 
ranged from .88 to .97 for children with moderate intellectual disability; similar correlations 
were found with a sample of typically-developing children. 
In addition to the above-noted studies, the authors of the SIB-R included inter-rater 
reliability data from the original version of the measure (SIB; Bruininks, Woodcock, 
Weatherman, & Hill, 1984). The authors evaluated the reliability between teachers and teacher’s 
aids and the results demonstrated moderate to high correspondence at .80 for the Broad 
Independence Score, and the cluster scores ranged from a low of .74 to a high of .86. The sample 
used for this study included 39 adolescents with moderate or severe intellectual disability. 
Adaptive Behavior Assessment System – Second Edition (ABAS-II; Harrison & 
Oakland, 2003). The authors of the ABAS-II conducted four interrater reliability studies (N = 
309). Of the four studies, one was conducted using the Teacher/Daycare rating forms, two with 
the Teacher rating forms and one with the Parent/Primary Caregiver forms. All studies were 
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conducted using samples of typically-developing children and youth. Results from these limited 
studies showed moderate to high consistency (correlations ranged from .58 to .93). 
 Teacher/Daycare (N = 42): ages 2-5 years; Corrected r for the Conceptual 
Domain = .83; Social Domain = .74; Practical Domain = .74; Global Adaptive 
Composite = .83 
 Teacher (N = 34): ages 5-9 years; Corrected r for the Conceptual Domain = .58; 
Social Domain = .74; Practical Domain = .92; Global Adaptive Composite = .93 
 Teacher (N = 50): ages 10-18 years; Corrected r for the Conceptual Domain = 
.72; Social Domain = .75; Practical Domain = .88; Global Adaptive Composite = 
.90 
 Parent/Primary Caregiver (N = 56): ages 0-5 years; Corrected r for the Conceptual 
Domain = .86; Social Domain = .72; Practical Domain = .77; Global Adaptive 
Composite = .82 
Adaptive Behavior Assessment System – Third Edition (ABAS-3; Harrison & 
Oakland, 2015). Interrater reliability studies conducted for the ABAS-3 included the 
Parent/Primary Caregiver Form (two samples delineated by age categories), the Teacher/Daycare 
Provider Form (two samples delineated by age categories), and the Adult Form Rated by Others4. 
Of the five studies, the results of four are applicable to individuals from birth to age 21, while the 
fifth was conducted using the Adult Form, Rated by Others (applicable to people age 16 to 89). 
The correlations indicated moderate to strong correspondence between raters on all forms 
(correlations ranged from .68 to .92); as would be expected, the General Adaptive Composite  
(GAC) scale demonstrated the highest correspondence.  
                                                          
4 Information regarding the raters is not provided in the manual for the ABAS-3. 
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According to the authors, “the results show that the interrater reliability of the ABAS-3 
scores is acceptable for clinical use and consistent with that of other behavior rating scales”(p. 
80). Based on a notation in the manual, it appears that the normative samples did not include 
individuals diagnosed with intellectual disability:  
… sampling methods are designed to include cases with mild disabilities, as long as the 
severity does not preclude mainstream activities (such as general education). Over a large 
standardization sample, these methods are designed to include these mild problems at 
their population base rate. (p. 60)  
As is true for other measures, this exclusion limits the applicability of the measure in evaluations 
conducted within the legal system where the evaluation and diagnosis of intellectual disability is 
the central issue. 
Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales – Second Edition (VABS-II; 2008). Inter-rater 
reliability studies for the VABS-II were provided for the Parent/Caregiver Rating Form 
(appropriate for individual’s birth to 90) and the Survey Interview Form (appropriate for 
individual’s birth to 90). Both studies utilized samples of typically-developing individuals. The 
VABS-II provides scores for five sub-domains (i.e., Communication; Daily Living; 
Socialization; Play and Leisure; Motor) and the Adaptive Behavior Composite (ABC). Using a 
sample of 112 typically developing individuals (ages birth to 18 years) the authors found 
moderate concordance for the sub-domains (range .72 to .80), as well as the ABC (i.e., .78). 
Similar results were found for the Parent/Care Giver Form (N = 152; ages birth to 18 years) 
concordance for the sub-domains ranging from .71 to .83 and an ABC of .82. .82. Inter-rater 
reliability statistics were not provided for the Parent/Caregiver Form as applied to a sample of 
typically developing individual’s age 19-61 (n=39), and as noted in the manual, this was because 
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inter-rater reliabilities “were strongly affected by the large proportion of cases scoring at or just 
below the maximum score on subdomains”(p. 119).  
Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales –Third Edition (VABS-3; Sparrow, Cicchetti, & 
Saulnier, 2016). Three inter-rater reliability studies were conducted, all with individuals that fall 
in the age category of birth to age 20 years (i.e., Parent/Caregiver; Teacher/Teacher; 
Interviewer/Interviewer). Correlations were noted to be good to excellent range (e.g., corrected r 
ranged from .70 to .81 on the Comprehensive Form Domains of the Interview Form). According 
to the authors, the results of the inter-rater reliability conducted with adults were uninterpretable 
due to the ceiling effect of the sample. 
The normative sample included individuals with developmental disabilities and did so 
based on the U.S. government statistics on special education services (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 2014). As noted in the manual, sampling targets included individuals with 
intellectual disability, developmental delay, autism, emotional disturbance, specific learning 
disability, and speech/language impairment; other classifications were grouped together in an 
“other IDEA disabilities categories.” The percentage of individuals in the normative samples for 
the three forms of the VABS-3 (i.e., interview; parent/caregiver; teacher) varied, but were 
reported to closely match that of the population of the United States. Given the method used to 
norm this measure, there is no information regarding inter-rater reliability for individuals with 
intellectual disability. 
Memory 
All information is subject to distortion and the data obtained is inextricably linked to the 
accuracy of memory and the accuracy of perceptions at the time of contact; one of which is 
known to be fallible (memory; see for example, Loftus, 2003) and the other known to be affected 
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by multiple factors unique to the perceiver and each situation (perceptions; De Los Reyes & 
Kazdin, 2005). Thorough coverage of this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, and as such, 
what is mentioned here is that deemed relevant to understanding memory in the context of 
completing measures of adaptive behavior in a retrospective manner. 
While atypical, retrospective accounts of the behavior and abilities of others can be 
viewed as autobiographical memories. Raters must think about a specific time-period in their 
lives and bring forth a memory of having witnessed another person carrying out a task (or not), 
how well and/or how often they carried out that task, and whether they carried out that task with 
or without assistance. Autobiographical memories are reconstructions of the past that are prone 
to error and distortion, and are influenced by knowledge, attitudes and beliefs (Schacter, 2012). 
Hence, the data obtained from retrospective administration of measures of adaptive behavior 
cannot reflect reality, but instead reflect the perceptions of the rater gleaned from a 
reconstruction of their past.   
Schema Theory 
Research has shown that memories are organized and stored in a manner that assigns 
meaning to experience (Bartlett, 1932); memories guide behavior (Bartlett, 1932; Shea, Krug, & 
Tobler, 2008; Kumeran et al., 2009), and facilitate encoding and retrieval (Anderson, 1984; 
Preston & Eichenbaum, 2013; Preston & Eichenbaum, 2013; Van Kesteren et al., 2013). One 
way researchers and theorists have conceptualized the organization and storage of memories is 
based in schema theory (Bartlett, 1932; Markus & Zajonc, 1985). At the most basic level, 
schemas provide a way to conceptualize how knowledge obtained from prior experiences 
influence an individual’s attention and behavior and their interpretation of events, and as such, 
influence the reconstruction of memories (Lampinen, Copeland, & Neuschatz, 2001).  
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The ratings of prior behavior, and the standard scores produced therefrom, are the 
product of the amalgamation of data that has been collected and integrated on a daily basis for 
many years. By the time an individual has reached adulthood, many actions have been frequently 
expressed and are typical behaviors associated with everyday living; this is true for individuals 
diagnosed with ID and those without, though the range of behavior is not the same. Research has 
shown that when asked to recall an event that is an example of an action or experience that has 
been repeated many times (e.g., puts dishes away), semantic memories are produced. A semantic 
memory is a memory of a prototypical experience that has occurred many times and when 
accessed the outcome is merely an inference that may or may not reflect reality (Belli, 1988; 
Brewer, 1986; Jobe et al., 1990; Means & Loftus, 1991; Menon, 1994). 
Memory reconstruction and admissibility  
With recognition of the fallibility of memory, the British Psychological Society generated 
a set of guidelines regarding memory processes, as the findings might be applied within the legal 
arena (Conway & Holmes, 2008). As would be expected, the overarching theme was that human 
memory is fallible and much of the time it is difficult, if not impossible, to tease out reality from 
reconstruction. The research group identified 10 key points, five of which are relevant to 
memory in the context of the retrospective assessment of adaptive behavior: 
1. Memories are records of people’s experiences of events and are not a record of the events 
themselves. 
2. Remembering is a constructive process. 
3. Memories typically contain only a few highly specific details. 
4. The content of memories arises from an individual’s comprehension of an experience, 
both conscious and non-conscious. 
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5. People can remember events that they have not experienced.  
The authors of the guidelines discussed the implications of memory research in the context of the 
typical legal proceedings where the issue arises (e.g., eye-witness testimony; memory and stress; 
witness interviews) and not within the context of the Atkins proceedings. However, as previously 
mentioned, the accuracy of memory is paramount in Atkins proceedings as they include data 
derived from memory (e.g., standard scores from measures of adaptive behavior) and these data 
are entered into evidence and conceptualized as accurate representations of the past. Review of 
the structure of these measures immediately calls into question the accuracy of the data 
produced, as well as their admissibility in legal proceedings.  
All measures of adaptive behavior have methods by which information obtained by raters 
is represented by one or more statistics that provide a meaningful representation of a construct 
(e.g., standard scores; rankings; age equivalents). Though rating options and instructions differ 
by measure, raters must have very specific knowledge of a person’s ability to carry out many 
tasks and how often they do them without the assistance of others. For example, the Vineland-3 
Comprehensive Interview Form consists of 458 items across 11 adaptive behavior subdomains, 
with three rating options and a fourth that permits the rater to provide an estimate rather than a 
known. The SIB-R is similarly detailed with 315 questions spread across 14 sub-scales with four 
rating options and the ability to identify when responses reflects guesses rather than knowledge. 
Unlike the Vineland–3, the SIB-R places contingencies on the ratings that reflect how well the 
individual carries out the task, the percentage of time they carry out the task and whether they 
need to be asked to do so. As evident above, completing these instruments in accordance with 
how they were designed is difficult and at times requires making an inference; to think that the 
statistical data obtained from retrospective accounts represent “ground truth” is unrealistic.  
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Inter-Rater Reliability, Intellectual Disability, and the Retrospective Assessment of 
Adaptive Behavior 
It has been 15 years since the ruling in Atkins v. Virginia (2002), but few studies have 
been conducted in that time on the retrospective assessment of intellectual disability as relevant 
to legal cases. For instance, Doane and Salekin (2009) examined how susceptible the ABAS-II 
and SIB-R are to feigned adaptive behavior deficits, finding that faking was easily detected by 
the SIB-R, but not by the ABAS-II. More recently, Boccaccini, Kan, Rufino, Noland, Young-
Lundquist, and Canales (2016) examined correspondence between correctional staff ratings and 
offender ratings of adaptive behavior, using the ABAS-II. They found that correctional staff 
assigned significantly lower scores than probationers, with other findings suggesting the 
offenders’ self-report scores were likely more valid than the correctional officers’ reports. Their 
findings highlight the limitations of using correctional staff members as respondents for adaptive 
behavior assessments. 
Though few studies, like those mentioned above, have been conducted in this area since 
the Atkins ruling, not a single empirical study has been conducted on the inter-rater reliability of 
measures of adaptive behavior when used with individuals with mild ID, nor has there been a 
study on the inter-rater reliability of retrospective assessment. In order for triers-of-fact to 
evaluate this data in line with the holding in Daubert and the F.R.E. 702, research in both of 
these areas is necessary. At the time of writing, there is no way to know the level of concordance 
to expect under the best circumstances for assessments of individuals with mild ID (i.e., ratings 
made in real-time during the developmental period), never mind those conducted in the legal 
system (i.e., retrospective).  
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Three case examples are presented, each of which illustrate how measures of adaptive 
behavior can interfere with diagnostic and legal decision-making. One case was conducted in 
juvenile court and as such, was conducted in real-time and within the developmental period. The 
other two cases were conducted retrospectively; one close in time to the developmental period 
and the other well outside of this time-period. Together, these cases show the lack of 
concordance that can occur with the results so disparate that it is difficult to know how to use the 
information, or if the data should be used at all. 
Case 1: Youthful Offender 
To demonstrate that high variability can be obtained on measures of adaptive behavior, 
even when assessments are carried out in accordance with the standards of practice, a case from 
juvenile court is provided. In this case, the clinician was asked to conduct an aid to sentencing 
evaluation for a youth with no previous criminal history who had been adjudicated delinquent 
secondary to the commission of a crime that involved the use of a firearm. Since the defendant 
was a juvenile (i.e., 16 years of age) there was no need to conduct a retrospective assessment of 
adaptive behavior. The youth’s Full Scale IQ was measured to be 67 with the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale– Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV; Wechsler, 2008), and his age-based standard 
score in Total Achievement on the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Achievement – Third Edition 
(WCJ-III; Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001) was 65 (1st percentile), indicating he was 
performing well below his same-age peers in the academic setting. 
At the time of the evaluation, this youth was living with his aunt and uncle and had done 
so on an intermittent basis for several years. His placement in his aunt’s home was due to 
difficulties within his immediate family, but despite family discord, this youth had frequent and 
lengthy contact with his mother.  
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The ABAS-II was completed by his mother, his maternal aunt, and three of his teachers 
(two of his general education teachers and his special education tutor). All assessments were 
contemporary in time and raters appropriate with regard to level of knowledge and type and 
extent of contact. In this case, the judge disregarded the findings of all adaptive behavior 
measures. Figure 1 and Table 1 show the results of the ABAS-II and demonstrate the lack of 
concordance that can occur, even when the assessment is carried out in real time.  
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 here] 
Case 2: Results from an assessment of ID in the context of Atkins 
The second case example shows data that was obtained for a trial level Atkins proceeding; 
the assessment was conducted seven months after the defendant’s incarceration on the charge of 
capital murder. At the time of the crime the defendant was 27 years of age. Three people, all 
family members, completed the SIB-R and did so based on their recollections of the defendant’s 
functioning 11 years prior (i.e., when he was 16 years of age). This defendant had been assessed 
for intellectual disability in the past and his full-scale IQ scores ranged from 53 to 62. Based on 
current testing, his full scale IQ was measured to be 51 and his grade-based standard score in 
Total Achievement on the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Achievement – Third Edition (WCJ-III; 
Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001) was 60 (grade equivalent = 2.2) indicating he was 
performing well below his same-age peers in the academic setting. 
The defendant’s mother was one of the raters and, with the exception of his incarceration, 
she had been in frequent and daily contact with her son since his birth. At the time she completed 
the ratings, her contact was limited to once per week, for brief periods of time. His younger sister 
was chosen as a second rater; her contact with her brother up to the age of 18 years was daily and 
for extended periods of time. She had moved out of the family home two years prior to his 
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incarceration, but during that time she frequently visited with him. Most recently her contact was 
limited to approximately once per month during visitation at the jail. The third rater was his 
maternal aunt, who had known the defendant since birth. She had always been in frequent, 
though not daily, contact with him when he lived in the community. In addition to contact with 
the defendant, she was in frequent contact with his mother via telephone and in-person visits; 
these contacts continued following the defendant’s arrest and incarceration. Since his arrest, his 
aunt had only seen him during court proceedings. Figure 2 and Table 2 show the results of the 
SIB-R and once again, demonstrate the lack of concordance between raters; this time for the 
retrospective assessment of adaptive behavior.  
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 2 here] 
Case 3: Results from an assessment of ID in the context of Atkins 
The third case example provides the data obtained from another assessment conducted for 
an Atkins hearing at the trial level. The defendant was 20 years of age at the time of the 
evaluation and due to his arrest (at age 19 years) and subsequent incarceration, approximately 11 
months had passed since each rater had been in contact with him in a community setting, and 24 
months since he exited the developmental period (i.e., passage of time between assessment and 
recollection was approximately two years). Between the time of his arrest and the time of the 
assessment, visitation between raters and the defendant was frequent, though for only short 
periods of time. All raters were family members, two sisters and one brother, and deemed 
appropriate in terms of relationship and prior level of contact (i.e., daily prior to his arrest).  
Despite the assessment having been conducted shortly after his transition into adulthood, 
raters outside of the family were not readily available. Three teachers and two employers were 
approached and all provided anecdotal information via interview; none of these individuals 
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believed that their memories could produce accurate ratings, nor did they believe that they had 
enough information to complete such an extensive behavior rating scale. In this case friends were 
few and work history limited to three jobs, all of which required limited skills (e.g., sweeping 
floors; picking up trash strewn on city property).   
As is evident from Figure 3 and Table 3, concordance was much higher in this case than 
those previously presented and in the opinion of the evaluator, was due to the lower level of 
functioning demonstrated by this individual in the community setting, as well as within the jail. 
The defendant demonstrated deficits in multiple domains that were easily seen and frequently 
expressed. These deficits impacted his ability to function in domains including, but not limited 
to, work, school, self-care, inter-personal relationships, and personal safety. Unlike many cases, 
information regarding his functioning was corroborated by multiple sources including anecdotal 
information provided by many third-party informants (e.g., teachers; employers; friends; family 
members) and records. Regarding measured intelligence, at the age of 18 years his full scale IQ 
was measured to be 57 and his IQ as per the current evaluation was found to be 67. 
[Insert Figure 3 and Table 3 about here] 
Discussion 
Given the gravity of legal proceedings, it would be expected that the tools used to assess 
status in relation to ID would be much more precise than has been demonstrated in the case 
studies provided. If these measures are tapping an underlying construct that can be measured and 
used as evidence to either support or refute the diagnosis of intellectual disability, there needs to 
be guidance as to how to interpret conflicting data. Should ratings only be taken from one 
source? If so, which source should be considered to be best? Is it permissible to take some scores 
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from one rater and some from another? Can one discount the perceptions of a single rater if they 
are out of line with others?  
In a community setting, the questions outlined above typically wouldn’t be asked, and the 
use of clinical judgment with the subjective meshing together of data would not raise concern. 
However, in legal contexts, these issues are of significant concern. The legal setting is 
adversarial and there is disagreement among evaluators the trier-of-fact must sort out the real 
from the simulated, the truth from the partial truth, and that which is believed to be true, but is 
not. 
Both the AAIDD and the APA have created a demarcation between what qualifies for a 
diagnosis of ID when AB measures are used and what does not, at least when the measures are 
used in accordance with standard of practice. As previously noted, the AAIDD defines 
significant deficits in adaptive behavior in the following manner: significant deficits equate to 
scores that are “approximately two standard deviations below the mean of either (a) one of the 
following three types of adaptive behavior: conceptual, social, or practical, or (b) an overall 
score on a measure of conceptual, social, and practical skills” (AAIDD, 2010, p. 43).  
Scores obtained from measures of adaptive behavior are purported to reflect something 
within the person that can be measured and quantified, specifically an individual’s adaptive 
functioning. However, these cases demonstrate such a lack of concordance that the data obtained 
from the retrospective application cannot be reflective of a single construct that exists in one 
form that can be measured and numerically expressed. Perhaps the scores obtained should not be 
considered reflective of a person’s adaptive behavior, but within the context of a retrospective 
assessment, should be re-conceptualized as a person’s memory, of their prior perception, of 
another person’s functional abilities, at some point in the distant past. In this way, the trier-of-
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fact is no longer looking for the “truth” when interpreting the scores, but rather a way to compare 
that person’s perspective, as depicted by standard scores, to a normative sample. Comparing 
scores produced by raters is necessary, but considering one to be “real” and another to be biased, 
inaccurate, or otherwise tainted may be unwarranted.  
The findings of research in the field of memory can assist clinicians and triers-of-fact 
with developing a strategy to evaluate data and make decisions about what to do with it. 
Recognition of the fact that human memory is not a recording of events, but is instead a 
reconstruction of one or more events, that may or may not have happened, that lacks detail or the 
detail provided is in error, is important for both the clinician and the trier-of-fact. Within this 
framework, interpretation of standard scores shifts from the focus from the claimant to the rater.  
As noted by De Los Reyes (2011), “support for informant discrepancy as a substantive 
construct comes from decades of basic psychological research in interpersonal perception and 
memory recall that broadly focuses on how different people often have different views of the 
same people or sets of behaviors” (p. 3). De Los Reyes was referencing multiple informant 
discrepancies when administered correctly, but clearly this statement holds true for retrospective 
assessments. In a 2005 manuscript, De Los Reyes and Kazdin explained informant discrepancies 
within the framework of the Attribution Bias Context Model. According to this model, 
discrepancies exist because informants differ along the following dimensions: (a) Attributions of 
cause (i.e., dispositional qualities vs. environmental constraints), (b) the biases or decision 
thresholds that guide decision-making, and (c) the contexts within which informants observe the 
behavior (e.g., home, school). These dimensions, understood in the past and the present, permit 
the understanding of data produced by measures of adaptive behavior.  
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There is a clear need for research that examines the validity of information obtained via 
adaptive behavior measures when administered retrospectively. The best data would come from 
studies that compare scores on a measure of adaptive behavior previously completed in 
accordance with the rules of administration with one completed years later. While this option is 
viable, studies have not yet conducted. A second method of assessing validity, though not ideal, 
is by looking at inter-rater reliability when an assessment is conducted with multiple raters, on 
the same adaptive behavior measure, for the same period of time, and completed at the same 
time. If concordance is high, one can infer that the scores represent reality, at least to some 
degree (see for example, Achenbach, McConaughy, & Howell, 1987; Szatmari, P., Archer, L., 
Fisman, S., & Streiner, D. L., 1994; De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2005; De Los Reyes, A., 2011).   
In addition to sound research on how these tools perform retrospectively and with 
multiple informants, research is also needed on the use of these tools in correctional and forensic 
contexts. Emerging research suggests that correctional staff members may not be a valid source 
of information for adaptive behavior assessments, as data show correctional staff may 
systematically underestimate adaptive behavior abilities in offenders (Boccaccini et al., 2016). 
This has been an issue that has been addressed by the AAIDD (2010; Schalock, 2010) and the 
association has been clear in stating their disapproval of this use of adaptive behavior measures.  
As per Daubert, an expert’s theory or technique must have been tested, subject to peer 
review, have a known or potential rate of error, have and maintain standards and controls, and be 
generally accepted in the scientific community. If the court were to consider the typical 
assessment of adaptive behavior – that is, inter-rater reliability conducted in real-time, with 
typically-developing individuals (primarily children), in one domain - it is likely the Daubert 
criteria would be met. However, what is typical in community settings is not what is typical in 
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the context of adult legal proceedings. In legal contexts, perhaps none of the admissibility criteria 
would be met for the retrospective administration of adaptive behavior measures. 
The results of these case studies do not support the admissibility of the results from 
adaptive behavior measures - at least not if the results are supposed to meet the standards put 
forth by Daubert or the F.R.E. and they are considered to be measures of adaptive behavior. 
Given the flexibility in Daubert and that admissibility is the purview of only the judge, the court 
may to choose to admit the results of the adaptive behavior measures administered 
retrospectively. That said, unlike much data provided to the court, there is no research to support 
the validity of results from adaptive behavior measures that were administered retrospectively.  
The problems associated with the retrospective use of adaptive behavior measures are 
part of a broader issue that pertains with the methods by which clinicians can, or perhaps should, 
conduct a retrospective assessment of ID. This calls for research that has the potential to improve 
accuracy in this area of psychological assessment and the application of the data to this area of 
the law. Inter-rater reliability (as was the focus of this paper), test-retest reliability (pre-18 
years versus post 18 - multiple raters from different contexts), inter-rater reliability 
(claimant versus rater), and the validity of cross-cultural application, are among many areas of 
needed research.  
It will take time for research to catch up with the needs of the legal system, and 
meanwhile the courts will continue to have to make determinations regarding who has 
intellectual disability and is thus not eligible for the death penalty. Clinicians will need to decide 
whether to use adaptive behavior measures or not, and to explain that decision in a court of law. 
These decisions should be guided by research (e.g., memory; typical assessment of ID), best 
practice, and ethical guidelines. The courts must be informed of the complexity of an assessment 
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of intellectual disability in the adult criminal justice system so they can ensure that they have the 
requisite knowledge and understanding of the disorder and the methods by which it is assessed. 
This knowledge and understanding will give the court the basis to make informed 
determinations. In the end, if admitted or not, the data produced from the retrospective 
administration of adaptive measures is inherently flawed and cannot be construed as a measure 
of adaptive behavior. Once again, the data must be recognized for what they are – simply 
numbers that represent a person’s current memory of their past perceptions, of another person’s 
behavior at a specific point in the distant past, the accuracy of which is unknown.   
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Figure 1.  ABAS-II Composite Scores from Multiple Raters from Case 1. 
 
Note: SPED = Special Education Teacher.  GAC = General Adaptive Composite.   
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Table 1.  Composite Scores and Descriptive Category from Multiple Raters from Case 1.  
Standard Scores by Rater 
 
 GAC Conceptual Social Practical 
Aunt 120 116 120 120 
Mother  95 93 103 91 
Mainstream Teacher A ** 98 ** 92 
Special Education Teacher 63 63 61 81 
Mainstream Teacher B 49 59 64 51 
 
Descriptive Classifications of Skill by Rater 
 
 GAC Conceptual Social Practical 
Aunt Superior Above Average Superior Superior 
Mother  Average Average Average Average 
Mainstream Teacher A ** Average ** Average 
Special Education Teacher Extremely Low Extremely Low Extremely Low Below Average 
Mainstream Teacher B Extremely Low Extremely Low Extremely Low Extremely Low 
 
Note:  GAC = General Adaptive Composite.  **Indicates missing data, as too many items were “guessed.”   
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Figure 2. SIB-R Standard Scores from Multiple Raters for Case 2. 
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Table 2.  Standard Scores, Age Equivalents, and Descriptive Classifications for the SIB-R from Multiple Raters for Case 2. 
Standard Scores by Rater 
 
 Broad 
Independence 
Motor 
Skills 
Social Interaction and 
Communication Skills 
Personal 
Living Skills 
Community 
Living Skills 
Mother 48 70 58 57 45 
Aunt 60 83 47 89 57 
Sister 85 78 64 113 93 
 
Age Equivalents by Rater 
 
 Broad 
Independence  
Motor 
Skills 
Social Interaction and 
Communication Skills 
Personal 
Living Skills 
Community 
Living Skills 
Mother 8-4 9-7 7-6 8-6 7-9 
Aunt 9-9 12-0 6-1 12-5 8-10 
Sister 13-5 11-0 8-8 22-0 14-11 
  
Descriptive Classifications of Skill by Rater 
 
 Broad 
Independence 
Motor 
Skills 
Social Interaction and 
Communication Skills 
Personal 
Living Skills 
Community 
Living Skills 
Mother Limited Limited Limited to Very 
Limited 
Limited to 
Very Limited 
Limited to 
Very Limited 
Aunt Limited Limited to 
Age-
appropriate 
Very Limited Limited to 
Age-
appropriate 
Limited 
Sister Limited to 
Age-
appropriate 
Limited to 
Age-
appropriate 
Limited Age-
appropriate 
to Advanced 
Limited to 
Age-
appropriate 
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Figure 3. SIB-R Composite Scores from Multiple Raters from Case 3. 
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Table 3.  Standard Scores, Age Equivalents, and Descriptive Classifications from Multiple Raters from Case 3. 
Standard Scores by Rater 
 Broad 
Independence 
Motor 
Skills 
Social Interaction and 
Communication Skills 
Personal 
Living Skills 
Community 
Living Skills 
Sister 1 50 46 55 74 61 
Sister 2 54 74 49 63 68 
Brother 40 48 47 55 54 
 
Age Equivalents by Rater 
 
 Broad 
Independence 
Motor 
Skills 
Social Interaction and 
Communication Skills 
Personal 
Living Skills 
Community 
Living Skills 
Sister 1 8-6 6-8 7-0 11-4 9-6 
Sister 2 9-0 10-3 6-3 9-6 10-7 
Brother 7-5 6-10 6-1 8-3 8-8 
  
Descriptive Classifications of Skill by Rater 
 
 Broad 
Independence 
Motor 
Skills 
Social Interaction and 
Communication Skills 
Personal 
Living Skills 
Community 
Living Skills 
Sister 1 Limited Limited to 
very limited 
Limited to very limited Limited Limited 
Sister 2 Limited Limited Limited to very limited Limited Limited 
Brother Limited to 
very limited 
Limited to 
very limited 
Very limited Limited to 
very limited 
Limited to 
very limited 
 
  
 
